

CASE ANNEX

Can I Build a Future?

Young movements, political change
and the future of multilateralism

Methodology, key findings and 29 cases

HOW TO READ THE ANNEX

The report follows what becomes of a public demand and of young people's collective capacity: their ability to organize and act together. It draws on a purposefully selected qualitative sample of 215 cases across 97 countries.

This annex explains the methods and presents fuller accounts of 29 cases. The accompanying table provides the evidence and coding for all 215 cases.

Sources and selection

Carnegie’s [Global Protest Tracker](#) provided the basis for the analysis. The tracker documents protests calling for changes in government policies, decisions or leadership. It selects protests in their national context and draws mainly on English-language reporting. Coverage is not exhaustive.

The study uses additional reporting to compare movements across regions, political outlooks, roles for young people and outcomes. Sources had to document young people’s role, the demands, the institutional response and what followed. Local and national reporting, including other languages, was read alongside international reporting, research and official documents. Material from participating organizations helped establish their actions and aims. The classifications and interpretations are those of this study.

Reading the evidence

The figures describe this selected sample. They cannot establish how common a pattern is worldwide or whether a movement alone caused an institutional change. Public evidence is often thinner during negotiations, implementation and later organizing. Follow-up periods also vary. “Not verified” means the sources did not establish a finding; it does not prove that nothing happened.

Core definitions

Term	Meaning
Case	The unit of comparison: 209 movements and six separate protests.
Movement	Connected collective action that persists or recurs beyond one protest. It can involve several organizations and groups with different views.
Central role	Young people led, organized, formed the main constituency or largely sustained the action.
Influential role	Young people helped shape a wider movement’s demands, methods, evidence or alliances.
Participating role	Young people or organizations linked to them joined action led by others.
Daily-life demands	Changes sought in safety, education, services, living costs, work, the environment, housing or land.
Power and accountability	Claims about public decisions, democratic safeguards, investigation, fair treatment, participation or transparency.
Institutional response	What institutions announced, adopted or implemented, including any use of force or restrictions; how far the response advanced the demand.
Clear institutional change	A verified change in law, policy, officeholders or institutions by the review date.
Stronger collective capacity	Evidence of stronger organization, leadership, decision-making, reach or a lasting ability to act together.
Continuing organization	An organization, coalition or wider network remained active at the review date.
Continuing influence	Evidence that movement participants still shaped the issue through formal roles, informal access or practical work.
Connections across borders	Documented solidarity, diaspora support, shared practices or symbols, or engagement with international institutions or processes.


What the sample covers

The sample follows actions from January 2019 to June 2026; some movements began earlier. The 29 cases include later developments through 8 September 2026. Other cases retain their own review dates. The case index uses the first protest included, which may differ from the movement’s founding date.

FIGURE A1

The study at a glance

The comparative sample covers movements and separate protests across five regions.



Each case covers a movement or a separate protest. These figures describe the selected sample.

Young people and organizers


In about three in four cases, young people led or sustained action, or helped shape a wider movement. The role categories describe what young people did; they do not imply a shared political outlook or authority to speak for every participant. The figures also identify other groups involved.

FIGURE A2

Young people in protest today

Young people took different roles in movements that involved a range of groups.


Young people’s role



163 cases involved at least three types of organization

Groups and networks involved

Number of cases



Each case has one role category. A case can include several types of groups or networks.


What people demanded

A movement may seek both reliable services and a role in the decisions that shape those services. Each case can therefore contain several demand categories. About four in five combined demands about daily life with demands about accountability or governing rules.


FIGURE A3

Make life possible


Demands about daily life often came with demands about how public power was used.



Daily life



Public power



Counts refer to cases. A case can contain several demands, so the two panels can overlap.

How institutions responded


An announcement, an inquiry, a decision and implementation are different findings. An implemented decision may still leave the central demand unresolved. Fewer than one in ten cases saw that demand advance; more than half saw action on part of a wider claim. The figures also track force, detention or restrictions and further demands arising from authorities’ conduct.

FIGURE A4


Make power answerable

The cases distinguish official action from how far the demand advanced.

Furthest institutional action



How far the demand advanced



126

59%

Force, detention or restrictions

Recorded in the institutional response

99

46%

Authorities’ conduct became part of the demand

Protesters challenged what officials did.

Counts refer to cases. Each upper chart counts each case once; the lower measures can overlap. Responses reflect each case’s last update.

Collective capacity after protest


Continued activity and stronger collective capacity are assessed separately. An organization can survive without gaining influence. An unresolved demand can also leave people better able to organize. These judgments reflect the evidence available at each case’s review date.

FIGURE A5


Make the future governable

Almost half retained existing capacity without clear evidence of growth.

How collective capacity changed



How organizing continued



Counts refer to cases. Collective capacity includes organization, leadership, reach and the ability to act together. Status reflects each case’s last update.


Connections across borders

A shared image does not establish a common organization. An international institution’s involvement does not show that protesters controlled its decisions or that governments carried them out. These figures count documented connections, including international legal or diplomatic processes; they do not measure effectiveness.

FIGURE A6

Where global commitments meet daily life

Solidarity and diaspora networks were the most commonly recorded connection.



75 cases documented connections that formed part of movement identity or continued organizing.

A case can include several types of connection. Each count uses the full sample of 215 cases.

Case index

The following accounts describe who organized, what they sought, how institutions responded and what continued. They are based on available public reporting. Cases appear in chronological order by the first protest included. Citation numbers link to each case's source list.

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MOV-049

France: Yellow Vest movement

First protest included: November 2018

Case overview

The Yellow Vest protests began in November 2018. This case follows the weekly demonstrations, roundabout occupations and local assemblies through 2019. Later activity by named local groups is recorded as a follow-up.^{[1][2]}

Young people and organizers

Young people participated in a movement that spanned generations. Student organizers took part, but did not lead the whole campaign. Interviews with young people in the Paris suburbs describe both participation and reluctance to join. They caution against treating young people from working-class neighbourhoods as one constituency.^{[3][4]} The survey cited here included an additional sample aged 18–35. It does not measure the age profile of street protesters.^[5]

How they organized and made decisions

Local groups used online calls, roundabout occupations and assemblies to organize. They also tried to coordinate nationally: 235 delegations met at Saint-Nazaire in April 2019 to debate tactics and the movement's future.^[1] These meetings provide evidence of coordination between local groups. They do not establish that one executive could speak for every participant.

Everyday needs

Protesters sought withdrawal of the fuel-tax increase, higher incomes, fairer taxation and better public services.^{[6][7]} The published 42-point demand list also addressed jobs, housing and home insulation.^{[7][8]}

Power and accountability

Demands included a stronger public say in decisions, notably through a citizens' initiative referendum.^[9] Police conduct became a further concern. In February 2019, student-union leader Louis Boyard announced plans to complain after being injured during a demonstration supporting people hurt in earlier protests.^[3]

Institutional response

The government abandoned the planned fuel-tax rise.^[6] A law enacted on 24 December 2018 introduced emergency economic and social measures.^[10] Macron also opened a national debate in January 2019.^[11] Police used water cannon and tear gas against demonstrators.^[12] These were concrete concessions alongside police force. The sources do not establish that the wider demands for redistribution and direct public control over decisions were met.

What continued

The Assembly of Assemblies shows an effort to sustain cooperation beyond individual demonstrations.^[1] In September 2025, Basta! reported that an active Montpellier Yellow Vest roundabout group had organized a local assembly for the later Bloquons Tout mobilization.^[2] That establishes continuity in one local group. It does not make the whole later campaign a continuation of the same organization.

Across borders

Protesters in Britain adopted the yellow vest, sometimes for conflicting political causes.^[13] The evidence supports the spread of a symbol. It does not establish a shared international body directing the French campaign.

Sources

- [1] [Le Monde — Yellow Vest Delegates Debate Methods and the Movement's Future](#)
- [2] [Basta! — Local assemblies and the Montpellier Yellow Vests group, 2 September 2025](#)
- [3] [Le Monde — « Gilets jaunes » : un syndicaliste lycéen blessé annonce qu'il va porter plainte](#)
- [4] [Metropolitics — How youth of the banlieues see the Gilets Jaunes](#)
- [5] [International Review of Social Psychology — Young adults in the Yellow Vest movement](#)
- [6] [The Guardian — France Withdraws the Fuel-tax Rise Amid Yellow Vest Protests](#)
- [7] [L'Obs — Analysis of the Yellow Vests' 42 demands, November 2018](#)
- [8] [La Gazette des communes — Yellow Vest demands, including home insulation, 10 December 2018](#)
- [9] [Le Monde — The citizens' initiative referendum demanded by Yellow Vests, 7 December 2018](#)
- [10] [Vie publique — Law of 24 December 2018 on emergency economic and social measures](#)
- [11] [The Guardian — Macron Opens the Grand Debat](#)
- [12] [The Guardian — Police Use Water Cannon and Tear Gas on Yellow Vest Protesters](#)
- [13] [The Guardian — Yellow vests: protesters fight for ideological ownership](#)

MOV-006

Argentina: anti-IMF and anti-austerity protests

First protest included: January 2019

Case overview

This case covers the January–February 2019 protests against rising utility and transport costs, followed by the anti-IMF demonstrations of 11 December 2021 and 8 February 2022.^{[1][2][3][4]} The actions are grouped because unions, student groups and left-wing organizations repeatedly contested debt repayment and cuts to public spending. Their participation varied between episodes.

Young people and organizers

Students helped shape parts of the campaign within a wider coalition. In February 2019, the University Federation of La Plata (FULP) called students to join a local protest and demanded an increase in the university transport subsidy.^[2] A December 2021 student call linked opposition to the IMF agreement with funding for education, health, decent jobs and housing.^[5] In February 2022, the named student groups included En Clave Roja, UJS, Juventud de Izquierda Socialista and Lista Violeta.^[6]

How they organized and made decisions

Organizers used torch marches, noisy street protests known as ruidazos, and rallies in central Buenos Aires. The 2019 actions involved unions and civic groups. Left parties, unions, social organizations and students took part in the December 2021 rally, and thousands demonstrated again in February 2022.^{[1][3][4]} The sources identify the participating organizations but do not establish a single elected leadership authorized to negotiate for the full coalition.

Everyday needs

Protesters challenged higher utility bills, transport costs and pressure on wages. FULP sought an increase in an existing transport subsidy and removal of barriers that prevented students from receiving the subsidy.^{[1][2]} The 2021–2022 student calls argued that debt repayment would divert money from education, health, jobs and housing.^{[6][5]} These were the organizers' stated concerns about the agreement.

Power and accountability

The campaign challenged who should pay for debt repayment and who should decide the terms. The February 2022 student statement also opposed the IMF's proposed oversight of Argentina's economy.^[6] Argentina's government negotiated the agreement, Congress approved the programme, and the IMF board controlled its own approval.^[7] The sources reviewed do not establish that protest representatives gained a formal role in these decisions.

Institutional response

Congress approved the programme, and the IMF Executive Board approved the extended arrangement on 25 March 2022.^[7] The agreement therefore went ahead despite the protests. The decision ran against the central demand to reject the agreement. The cited evidence does not establish adoption of the protesters' alternative or show that their concerns about living costs and public spending were resolved. It does not document a separate coercive response to the specific actions covered here.

What continued

Repeated calls and completed demonstrations show that existing student, party and union networks could mobilize again.^{[1][6][3][5][4]} They do not establish that these organizations formed a new common leadership or gained greater influence over implementation. The available evidence supports continued organizing during the covered period, without proving a lasting increase in the coalition's capacity.

Across borders

The protests directly contested a specific agreement with the IMF.^{[6][3][7]} That gives the case a clear multilateral connection. The sources do not establish a separate international movement organization or a role for protesters in negotiating the IMF's terms.

Sources

- [1] Euronews — Thousands march against Macri's austerity measures in Argentina
- [2] 0221 — FULP calls students to join the protest and seek a higher transport subsidy, 14 February 2019
- [3] Reuters — Anti-IMF Plaza de Mayo protest held 8 February 2022, reported 9 February
- [4] AFP / SWI swissinfo.ch — Anti-IMF demonstration in Buenos Aires, 11 December 2021
- [5] La Izquierda Diario — Student organizers' 11 December call, 3 December 2021
- [6] La Izquierda Diario — UNQ student organizations' call against IMF agreement, 5 February 2022
- [7] International Monetary Fund — Executive Board approves Argentina arrangement, 25 March 2022

MOV-159

Slovakia: For a Decent Slovakia and allied civic protests

First protest included: February 2019

Case overview

The case begins with the February 2019 commemorations of murdered journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová. It also covers the 2025 protests over the government's direction, relations with Russia and proposed restrictions on non-governmental organizations, followed by relevant court and government decisions in 2025–2026. The original 2018 mobilization is background to the included episodes.^{[1][2][3][4]}

Young people and organizers

Young organizers helped give For a Decent Slovakia (Za slušné Slovensko) a public voice. In February 2019, Denník N described 20-year-old university student Karolína Farská as a leading face of the protests alongside Juraj Šeliga. She continued working with the initiative while studying. The wider crowds included several generations.^[5]

How they organized and made decisions

Local organizers coordinated commemorations across many cities. In February 2025, For a Decent Slovakia and Peace for Ukraine (Mier Ukrajine) announced joint gatherings in Slovakia and abroad. These are distinct organizations cooperating on specific events. The reporting identifies their coordinating role but does not establish that they had authority to negotiate for every participant.^{[1][6]}

Everyday needs

The commemorations connected journalists' safety with accountability for the killings. Later actions centered on democratic institutions and the ability of civic organizations to work freely. The sources do not establish a distinct housing, employment or education programme for this coalition.^{[1][3][6]}

Power and accountability

Protesters challenged Prime Minister Robert Fico's closer relations with Russia and called for his resignation. The allied initiatives linked their February 2025 commemorations to defending democratic values and Slovakia's place in Europe. Opponents of the NGO bill argued that the proposed reporting requirements would burden independent civic work. These demands overlapped, but each belonged to a particular protest episode or organizing group.^{[2][3][6]}

Institutional response

Fico rejected calls to resign in January 2025.^[2] In December 2025, the Constitutional Court found the NGO law unconstitutional, including because its donor-disclosure requirements interfered with privacy. The ruling was a legal check on the restrictions, not proof that demonstrations alone caused the result.^[7] The European Commission subsequently recorded that, in February 2026, the government ordered intensified

checks on NGOs under existing rules. The court decision therefore did not end government pressure on the sector.^[4]

What continued

The joint 2025 events show that established civic initiatives could mobilize again and cooperate with partners. Continued civil-society scrutiny of the government is also evident in VIA IURIS's March 2026 rule-of-law assessment. That is evidence of ongoing civic activity, rather than proof of a single uninterrupted movement with unchanged membership.^{[6][8]}

Across borders

Organizers announced commemorations abroad as well as within Slovakia. EU rule-of-law monitoring also examined the restrictions on civic organizations. These are two different connections: public mobilization outside the country and institutional scrutiny at European level.^{[6][4]}

Sources

- [1] [Parlamentne Listy — Iniciatíva Za slušné Slovensko si pripomenie rok od vraždy novinára v 58 mestách](#)
- [2] [Reuters — Slovak PM Fico rejects calls to quit amid growing protests](#)
- [3] [Euronews — Thousands of Slovaks protest against Russian-style law targeting NGOs](#)
- [4] [European Commission — Slovakia country chapter, 2026 Rule of Law Report](#)
- [5] [Denník N — Interview with Karolína Farská, 20 February 2019](#)
- [6] [TA3 Slovakia — Iniciatívy Mier Ukrajine a Za slušné Slovensko spájajú sily: Tí, o ktorých Ján Kuciak písal, sú opäť pri moci](#)
- [7] [International IDEA — Slovakia's Constitutional Court strikes down NGO donor-disclosure law](#)
- [8] [VIA IURIS — Contribution to Liberties Rule of Law Report 2026, 30 March 2026](#)

MOV-149

Romania: protests for an independent justice system

First protest included: February 2019

Case overview

The case covers the February–March 2019 protests against Emergency Ordinance 7, which changed judicial rules, and renewed demonstrations after Recorder's December 2025 investigation into alleged abuses in the justice system. The two waves addressed related concerns but arose from different decisions and revelations.^{[1][2]}

Young people and organizers

Students joined professors and magistrates in defending judicial independence. In March 2019, university protests took place in Bucharest, Sibiu, Iași and Cluj-Napoca. Students helped shape a wider civic campaign; the evidence does not show that they led the whole movement.^[3]

How they organized and made decisions

University staff used campus networks to call peaceful demonstrations. A Bucharest Faculty of Letters invitation asked participants to wear white armbands and stand outside the faculty for an hour. Street organizers also used Facebook to announce a march to the Justice Ministry. These sources describe how people mobilized but do not establish a single elected body representing all protesters.^{[4][5]}

Everyday needs

The cited demands focused on fair, independent courts and protection from political interference. They do not establish a separate campaign for education funding, jobs or housing. Student participation should therefore be understood through the justice demands they supported.^{[4][3][5]}

Power and accountability

In 2019, demonstrators demanded repeal of the ordinance and closure of the special unit investigating magistrates, which they viewed as a means of intimidation. Some also called for the government to resign and for early elections.^[5] In 2025, Recorder's investigation alleged that senior judges enabled serious cases to collapse and punished dissent within the judiciary. Around 700 judges and prosecutors publicly raised concerns about systemic dysfunction. These were reported allegations and institutional criticisms, not findings against every official mentioned.^[2]

Institutional response

The government reversed some 2019 changes to chief-prosecutor appointments but left other contested provisions in place. Magistrates therefore regarded the rollback as insufficient.^[6] In December 2025, the president announced consultations with magistrates. That announcement alone does not establish that

protesters obtained the reforms they sought.^[2] The European Commission's July 2026 assessment found no progress on its recommendation to strengthen safeguards for senior prosecutors and judicial police.^[7]

What continued

Civic pressure continued beyond the December demonstrations. Declic and Corupția Ucidă were among the groups that signed an April 2026 letter criticizing the president's justice appointments and his response to warnings from magistrates. The letter establishes those organizations' continued advocacy, not the views of every participant in either protest wave.^[8]

Across borders

The European Commission's rule-of-law review provided an external assessment of the justice system. It was an EU monitoring process, rather than evidence of a cross-border organization directing the demonstrations.^[7]

Sources

- [1] [Euronews — Thousands of Romanians protest against judicial changes](#)
- [2] [Reuters — Thousands of Romanians protest against judicial abuses](#)
- [3] [Romania Journal — Professors and students join magistrates' protests in Bucharest and other cities](#)
- [4] [HotNews Romania — Protestele față de controversata Ordonanță 7 se extind: Profesorii și studenții de la Litere ies în stradă](#)
- [5] [Romania Journal — Sunday protest announced to demand repeal of the ordinance](#)
- [6] [Reuters — Partial rollback of judicial changes, 2019](#)
- [7] [European Commission — 2026 Rule of Law Report, Romania country chapter](#)
- [8] [Declic — Open letter to President Nicușor Dan, 17 April 2026](#)

MOV-041

Czechia: Million Moments for Democracy

First protest included: April 2019

Case overview

The case covers Million Moments for Democracy's 2019 demonstrations and its later campaigns to defend democratic institutions, including public-service media in 2026. The group began as a student initiative in 2017. That earlier history explains its origins, while the included case begins in April 2019.^{[1][2]}

Young people and organizers

Students helped found the organization and build a movement that reached a much broader public. Research traces its development from student activism into a staffed organization with local volunteers and sustained election-related campaigning. Young people were therefore important organizers, even though the demonstrations were not limited to them.^{[1][2]}

How they organized and made decisions

Million Moments maintains a network of local groups. Its website invites volunteers to organize demonstrations and public discussions, and offers accredited local organizers materials, training and regular meetings where they can contribute to the organization's direction. This is a concrete route for local participation. It does not mean every person attending a rally elects the national leadership.^[3]

Everyday needs

The main concerns in the cited episodes are independent institutions and access to trustworthy public information. The case does not establish a separate programme of housing, jobs or tuition demands. Students' April 2026 protests concerned the future independence and funding of public television and radio.^[4]

Power and accountability

The 2019 campaign challenged Andrej Babiš's government and defended judicial independence. The organization later encouraged voter participation and cooperation among opposition parties. Research describes its contribution to election campaigns while also recognizing the wider political forces shaping those elections.^[2] In 2026, protesters challenged proposed changes to media funding and other measures they feared would weaken democratic checks on the government.^[5]

Institutional response

Babiš remained in office after the 2019 protests, lost power following the 2021 election and returned as prime minister in December 2025. Those changes cannot be attributed to the movement alone.^{[5][2]} In April 2026, students opposed a proposal to replace public broadcasters' licence fees with state-budget

funding. By the June 21 rally, the government had approved its plan, with further legislative steps still required. Continued protest is not evidence that the proposal had been withdrawn.^{[4][6]}

What continued

The organization retained a volunteer network and returned to mass mobilization. In March 2026, it organized the country's largest anti-government rally since 2019. It then promoted a public-media petition and further protest. Student demonstrations in April and the June rally show continued opposition to the funding changes.^{[7][5][4][6][3]}

Across borders

The organization explicitly includes supporters abroad in its network. It also shared its 2026 public-media campaign through the European Civic Forum and invites cooperation with civic organizations elsewhere in Europe. These sources establish international outreach and network connections, although they do not by themselves demonstrate the results of that cooperation.^{[1][7][3]}

Sources

- [1] [Million Moments for Democracy — organization and campaign structure](#)
- [2] [Frontiers in Political Science — Organizational development of Million Moments, 2025](#)
- [3] [Million Moments — How to join the local network](#)
- [4] [Associated Press — Czech students protest a government plan to overhaul funding for public media](#)
- [5] [Reuters — Czechs rally in country's largest anti-government protest since 2019](#)
- [6] [Associated Press — June 2026 public-media protest](#)
- [7] [Civic Forum — Million Moments for Democracy launches signatory appeal in support of public service media and plans protest march.](#)

MOV-211

Pacific youth campaign for climate justice at the ICJ

First protest included: September 2019

Case overview

The case follows a student campaign from public action in 2019 to the International Court of Justice's climate advisory opinion in July 2025 and follow-up in 2026. Its included public actions are the September 2019 Port Vila climate strike, the September 2022 New York flotilla and the December 2024 Hague demonstration. These episodes supplement the protest tracker used elsewhere in the annex.^{[1][2][3]}

Young people and organizers

Pacific law students initiated the campaign and developed its legal and public strategy. Pacific Islands Students Fighting Climate Change (PISFCC) and World's Youth for Climate Justice sustained the work with international partners. Young people were central to the campaign's creation and direction. Governments and the Court nevertheless controlled the formal diplomatic and judicial decisions.^{[4][5][6]}

How they organized and made decisions

The Vanuatu Climate Action Network organized the September 20, 2019 strike with students and member organizations, including PISFCC. The action called for a climate-emergency declaration.^[1] In New York, PISFCC worked alongside Greenpeace Australia Pacific, Amnesty International and other participants to press governments to support Vanuatu's proposed request to the Court.^[2] World's Youth for Climate Justice called a solidarity demonstration outside the Peace Palace for December 2, 2024. A later account by PISFCC's director describes the gathering during the hearings.^{[4][3]}

Everyday needs

Campaigners connected climate change to the security of homes, food, water, health, livelihoods and Pacific cultures. They sought protection for people already experiencing climate harm and for future generations. These concerns gave the legal campaign a practical purpose: making governments answer for threats to the conditions people need to live safely.^{[4][2]}

Power and accountability

The campaign sought an authoritative statement of states' climate obligations and the consequences of failing to meet them. Students promoted the proposal, Vanuatu led state diplomacy, the General Assembly requested the opinion and the ICJ decided the legal questions. These roles should not be merged into a claim that the youth organizations controlled the UN or the Court.^{[2][5][7]}

Institutional response

On March 29, 2023, the General Assembly requested the advisory opinion. The Court delivered its unanimous opinion on July 23, 2025, clarifying states' obligations under existing international law.^{[5][7]} On May 20, 2026, the General Assembly adopted a follow-up resolution supporting the opinion, with 141 votes in favour, eight against and 28 abstentions.^[8] The campaign achieved its immediate objective of obtaining the opinion. The opinion itself is not a binding judgment ordering an individual state to pay compensation, although the legal obligations it clarifies are binding.^{[7][9]}

What continued

PISFCC and World's Youth for Climate Justice contributed to litigation notes published with legal organizations in February 2026. World's Youth for Climate Justice also provides an implementation toolkit for advocates, policymakers and civil society. These are concrete outputs that extend the campaign beyond securing the opinion. They do not establish that all governments have complied.^{[9][6]}

Across borders

Regional student organizing, international civil-society partnerships and the UN-ICJ process were central to the campaign. The New York action and shared legal resources document actual cooperation across countries.^{[2][6]}

Sources

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- [7] [ICJ — Advisory opinion of 23 July 2025, full text on official UN-hosted mirror](#)
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- [9] [World's Youth for Climate Justice — Implementation tools and legal resources](#)

MOV-044

Ecuador: CONAIE-led protests over austerity and fuel prices

First protest included: October 2019

Case overview

The case covers the October 2019 protests against Decree 883 and the renewed strike over diesel prices in September–October 2025. Their outcomes differed: the government reversed the 2019 subsidy cut, while CONAIE ended the 2025 strike without securing a comparable reversal.^{[1][2][3]}

Young people and organizers

Students and young people joined a wider mobilization led by Indigenous organizations, with transport and labour groups also involved. Universities provided refuge and support for protesters in Quito. The evidence supports youth participation, while the formal negotiations were led by Indigenous representatives.^{[4][5][6]} CONAIE's regional organizations include ECUARUNARI in the highlands, CONFENIAE in the Amazon and CONAICE on the coast.^[7]

How they organized and made decisions

Marches and road blockades brought pressure to bear on the government. Indigenous leaders then negotiated the 2019 agreement.^[4] Electoral divisions in 2025 showed that CONAIE's leaders did not speak for every Indigenous voter.^[8] Its own published resolutions also document regional deliberation and collective positions.^[9]

Everyday needs

Protesters opposed fuel-price increases because they affected transport, agricultural production and household costs. In 2025, ending the diesel subsidy raised the price from US\$1.80 to US\$2.80 per gallon. Diesel powered tractors, trucks and many buses used by poorer households.^[2] Amnesty International also warned that the 2019 austerity package threatened household incomes and the affordability of essential goods.^[10]

Power and accountability

The dispute concerned both the cost of reform and communities' influence over the decisions. In 2019, Amnesty documented restrictions on assembly, mass arrests and reports of excessive force against protesters and journalists.^[10] When ending the 2025 strike, CONAIE demanded withdrawal of troops from Indigenous territories, release of detainees, treatment and reparations for those harmed, and an end to persecution of its members.^[3]

Institutional response

President Lenín Moreno signed a decree reversing the subsidy cut on October 14, 2019, restoring previous fuel prices.^[1] In October 2025, President Daniel Noboa threatened to use the military to clear roadblocks. CONAIE president Marlon Vargas announced the end of the strike on October 22, saying the decision was needed to protect lives. The diesel policy remained in place.^{[2][3]}

What continued

The 2025 strike demonstrates that CONAIE remained able to mobilize nationally, although it did not obtain its central fuel demand. When the strike ended, Vargas called members back to territorial assemblies and urged a campaign against the government's referendum proposals. This was a plan for continuing political work, rather than evidence that the fuel dispute had been resolved.^[3]

Across borders

The United Nations helped mediate the 2019 talks. This gave the dispute an international diplomatic channel.^[4]

Sources

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- [2] [Associated Press — Ecuador protests after diesel-subsidy removal](#)
- [3] [Primicias — CONAIE ends 2025 national strike and sets further demands, 22 October 2025](#)
- [4] [Reuters — Ecuador's president strikes 'peace' deal, agrees to change fuel subsidy cuts](#)
- [5] [DDRN — Universities in Ecuador support human rights, 4 August 2023](#)
- [6] [Cultural Survival — Indigenous-led protests in Ecuador, 11 October 2019](#)
- [7] [CONAIE — Thirty-five years of struggle and unity, 18 November 2021](#)
- [8] [Al Jazeera — Ecuador's Indigenous movement splinters over presidential election support](#)
- [9] [CONAIE — Expanded Council resolutions, 13 August 2020](#)
- [10] [Amnesty International — Ecuador authorities must end repression demonstrations](#)

MOV-038

Colombia: National Strike and campaigns against police abuse

First protest included: November 2019

Case overview

The case links the November 2019 National Strike, the September 2020 protests after Javier Ordóñez died in police custody, and the 2021 strike that began over tax reform. It also follows later police-accountability work and a related union mobilization in May 2025. These episodes shared organizations and concerns, but did not have one unchanging leadership.^{[1][2][3]}

Young people and organizers

Students, young neighbourhood activists and protest-frontline groups played important roles alongside unions, Indigenous organizations and other social movements. Students pressed demands over repression and the treatment of social leaders. Young people on the front lines emphasized both economic opportunity and freedom from police humiliation and violence.^{[2][4]}

How they organized and made decisions

Participants used strikes, marches, neighbourhood assemblies and roadblocks. Local protection, medical and documentation groups supported people facing violence.^{[4][5]} The National Strike Committee coordinated formal calls, but local protest hubs also brought together people with distinct demands. The sources therefore do not justify treating committee decisions as instructions authorized by every youth or neighbourhood group.^[4]

Everyday needs

Participants challenged poverty, unemployment and inadequate investment in education, health care and pensions.^[1] The 2021 tax proposal would have increased taxes on some everyday goods and services. Its opponents also sought withdrawal of a proposed health-care reform. Blocking those bills addressed immediate concerns, without establishing that the wider demands for better living conditions had been met.^{[6][7]}

Power and accountability

The campaigns sought investigations and remedies for killings, disappearances, sexual violence and other abuses during protest. Human-rights organizations documented allegations and pressed for changes in policing. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) later assessed the state's response to recommendations on protest rights, police conduct, investigations and protection of victims.^{[4][5]}

Institutional response

President Iván Duque withdrew the tax-reform proposal in May 2021. Lawmakers also rejected the health-care reform that month. These were distinct decisions by different institutions.^{[6][7]} The IACHR's second follow-up report, adopted in October 2025, assessed 33 recommendations: two fully implemented, eight substantially but partly implemented, 18 partly implemented and five still pending. Eight other recommendations were outside that compliance table. The findings show partial progress, with most recommendations still not fully implemented.^[5]

What continued

Victims and civil-society organizations continued contributing evidence to IACHR monitoring.^[5] The National Strike Committee and unions including CUT, CGT, CTC and Fecode called further demonstrations on May 28–29, 2025, linked to the labour-reform dispute. Their return shows continued organizing by those bodies. It does not establish that all the youth and neighbourhood groups active in 2021 endorsed the later campaign.^[3]

Across borders

The IACHR provided a formal regional route for receiving testimony, making recommendations and monitoring implementation. Colombian victims and organizations contributed to that process. The Commission remained an external human-rights body rather than a movement leadership organization.^[5]

Sources

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- [2] [Corporate Accountability Lab — Why a Whole Country Went on Strike - And is Still Striking](#)
- [3] [La FM — National Strike Committee and union calls for 28–29 May 2025](#)
- [4] [CIVICUS Lens — Colombia rises in protest again](#)
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- [6] [Reuters — President withdraws tax reform, 2 May 2021](#)
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MOV-073

Hungary: SZFE student occupation and FreeSZFE

First protest included: August 2020

Case overview

Students began occupying Budapest's University of Theatre and Film Arts (SZFE) on August 31, 2020. They opposed the transfer of the public university to a foundation controlled by government-appointed trustees. The case follows the occupation and its continuation through the independent FreeSZFE Association.^{[1][2]}

Young people and organizers

Students organized and maintained the blockade, with support from teachers, artists and local residents. They guarded entrances and accepted donations of food, masks and hygiene supplies. Their stated aim was to keep the new management out while allowing education to continue. Young people were the principal organizers of the occupation.^{[3][4]}

How they organized and made decisions

The occupation used public assemblies and working groups.^[2] Students publicly set conditions for negotiations: they rejected the new board's legitimacy and would speak with the responsible ministry only through an open process. This establishes collective organizing and publicly stated demands. It does not establish that a single spokesperson controlled the occupation.^[3]

Everyday needs

Students wanted to continue their education with freedom to teach, learn and create. They also opposed the removal of the university senate's power over budgets, staffing and organization. When they left the buildings in November, they sought recognition for teaching and coursework already completed.^{[1][4]}

Power and accountability

The dispute concerned who should govern the university. The ministry appointed trustees and rejected the senate's nominees. Students demanded restoration of university autonomy.^{[1][3]} In November, teachers lost access to Neptun, the system used to administer courses and exams. This was a specific restriction affecting teaching during the conflict.^[5]

Institutional response

The foundation takeover took effect on September 1, 2020, despite the protest. It removed important decision-making powers from the senate and therefore ran against the students' central demand.^[1] Students left the buildings when nationwide COVID-19 rules required universities to move online in November. They maintained their demands and pursued legal action over the suspension of university operations. Their departure was not a negotiated settlement.^[4]

What continued

Students, teachers and staff established FreeSZFE to continue independent education and artistic work outside the restructured university. Its Emergency Exit programme arranged recognition of students' work by partner universities.^[2] Its published course listings include programmes running during 2026, showing continuing educational provision. The listings are the association's own account, not an independent audit of attendance.^[6]

Across borders

FreeSZFE reports agreements with seven European universities covering 17 classes and about 170 students. Named partners include Mozarteum Salzburg, the Ludwigsburg performing-arts academy, Warsaw's theatre academy and Accademia Teatro Dimitri. The partners recognized study towards their degrees, giving students a practical way to continue. These are historical programme figures, not September 2026 enrolment totals.^[2]

Sources

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- [2] [FreeSZFE — About the FreeSZFE association](#)
- [3] [24.hu — SZFE-hallgatók: A barikád addig marad, amíg a feltételeink nem teljesülnek](#)
- [4] [Mérce — Digital teaching and occupation under COVID restrictions, 10 November 2020](#)
- [5] [HVG — SZFE teachers blocked from Neptun, 8 November 2020](#)
- [6] [FreeSZFE — Published current course programme \(2026\)](#)

MOV-125

Nigeria: EndSARS and the campaign against police abuse

First protest included: October 2020

Case overview

The case covers nationwide EndSARS demonstrations in October 2020, including the Lekki toll-gate protest, and later investigations, compensation claims, litigation and remembrance. Young Nigerians sought an end to abuse by the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) and wider changes in policing.^{[1][2][3]}

Young people and organizers

Young organizers ran local protest sites and online campaigns. The Feminist Coalition raised and distributed funds for peaceful demonstrations. Its published project page also provides audited accounts and dated statements. This establishes a specific support role, without making the coalition the leadership of every protest.^{[4][3]}

How they organized and made decisions

Different local groups and support organizations handled mobilization, donations and practical assistance. The cited accounts do not establish a single body chosen to negotiate for all protesters.^[4] Rinu Oduala later served as a youth representative on the Lagos inquiry panel. Her participation shows one route into an official process, rather than a transfer of control over the inquiry to the movement.^[5]

Everyday needs

Safety from police violence was central. The widely circulated five demands also included better pay for police officers and psychological evaluation and retraining before former SARS officers were redeployed. These demands connected protection of the public to the way officers were managed and supported.^[6]

Power and accountability

The other demands called for release of arrested protesters, justice and compensation for victims, and an independent body to oversee investigation and prosecution of police misconduct.^[6] Amnesty International later documented lethal force, torture and attacks on protesters. It also reported that pro-government supporters instigated violence at some demonstrations. Those opposing actors should be distinguished from EndSARS organizers.^[1]

Institutional response

SARS was dissolved on October 11, 2020. A presidential panel accepted the five demands on October 13, and the National Economic Council instructed states to establish inquiry panels on October 15. These official decisions did not themselves establish full reform.^[6] The Lagos panel awarded compensation to victims. Oduala withdrew in February 2021 after objecting to its decision to return control of the Lekki toll gate to its operator.^{[5][7]} On July 10, 2024, the ECOWAS Court found rights violations and ordered compensation of ₦10 million for each applicant in the case, alongside investigations. The cited judgment announcement does not verify full compliance.^[2]

What continued

Rights organizations continued pressing for accountability. At the fifth anniversary in October 2025, Global Rights and the Rule of Law and Accountability Advocacy Centre (RULAAC) criticized the lack of justice and effective reform. The Feminist Coalition's own account says it returned to its wider work on women's rights after the protest-funding project. These are different organizational continuations.^{[4][3]}

Across borders

A Nigerian Diasporans Against SARS fundraising appeal documents a specific effort to mobilize support abroad; the appeal alone does not verify how funds were ultimately spent.^[8] Litigation before the ECOWAS Court provided a distinct regional legal route. Enough is Enough Nigeria's account identifies the applicants' legal coalition and Amnesty International's supporting legal submission.^[2]

Sources

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- [2] [Enough is Enough Nigeria — ECOWAS Court judgment on EndSARS, July 2024](#)
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- [4] [Feminist Coalition — EndSARS fundraising, support and movement organization](#)
- [5] [TheCable — Rinu Oduala Steps Down from Lagos Endsars Panel](#)
- [6] [Federal Ministry of Information and National Orientation — Minister's speech on EndSARS demands, 1 December 2020](#)
- [7] [TheCable — Lagos EndSARS panel concludes sittings and awards ₦148.2 million to 23 victims](#)
- [8] [Nigerian Diasporans Against SARS — Diaspora fundraising appeal, 15 October 2020](#)

MOV-119

Myanmar: Spring Revolution and the response to military rule

First protest included: February 2021

Case overview

The case follows opposition to the February 2021 coup: street demonstrations, strikes and civil disobedience, followed by armed resistance and the development of alternative local administrations. It also examines ASEAN's diplomatic response. These activities became connected parts of the resistance, but they were not controlled by one organization.^{[1][2][3]}

Young people and organizers

Young people helped initiate protests and articulate a vision of federal democracy. Student unions from Yangon University, University of Medicine One and Mandalay University urged opposition representatives to adopt an interim federal constitution and include ethnic armed organizations in the emerging political settlement.^[4]

How they organized and made decisions

The National Unity Government (NUG), ethnic organizations, striking public employees and local resistance groups carried different responsibilities. The UN documents alternative administrations, schools and health services, with differing degrees of collective or centralized leadership. These differences rule out describing a single decision process for the whole resistance.^[2]

Everyday needs

Protection from military violence remained a central concern. Conflict and displacement continued, despite local provision of alternative services.^{[2][3]}

Power and accountability

Demands included release of prisoners, an end to military rule, federal democracy and accountability for abuses. Young activists also challenged older divisions between majority and minority communities.^{[4][5]} Their common opposition to military rule does not establish agreement on every political question.

Institutional response

ASEAN adopted its Five-Point Consensus on April 24, 2021. It called for an end to violence, dialogue, mediation by an envoy, humanitarian assistance and an envoy visit to meet all parties.^[6] Implementation remained limited. Reuters reported in January 2026 that the Philippines had hosted talks involving the NUG and the Chin National Front, while noting some improvement in humanitarian access and little broader progress.^[3] In July, Myanmar's foreign ministry contested how the consensus had been agreed. That statement records the authorities' position, rather than an independent determination of ASEAN policy.^[7]

What continued

The UN's June 2025 assessment documents young people contributing to local administrations and sending money and expertise from abroad. Public employees also used their skills to sustain alternative services. These activities show continuing organization, although their reach varied by territory.^[2]

Across borders

Activists elsewhere in Asia held solidarity actions under the Milk Tea Alliance banner.^[8] ASEAN supplied a formal diplomatic channel, while overseas supporters contributed resources and expertise. These connections supported different parts of the response and did not create one authority over the resistance.^{[6][2]}

Sources

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- [8] [Reuters — Milk Tea Alliance solidarity rallies, 28 February 2021](#)

MOV-181

Türkiye: feminist campaign to defend the Istanbul Convention

First protest included: March 2021

Case overview

The case follows opposition to Türkiye's March 2021 decision to leave the Istanbul Convention, the July demonstrations when withdrawal took effect, and later advocacy against violence towards women. The Convention is the Council of Europe treaty on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence.^{[1][2][3]}

Young people and organizers

Young women and campus feminist groups took part within a broader movement. Kadın İşçi's reporting from a June 2021 rally includes a participant from Kampüs Cadıları, alongside trade-union women, feminist organizations and LGBT+ groups. It establishes named student participation, without showing that young people formed a majority across the campaign.^[4]

How they organized and made decisions

Organizations used demonstrations, legal challenges and public statements to oppose withdrawal. The We Will Stop Femicide Platform also maintained its monitoring and advocacy work.^{[2][5][4]} These were distinct organizations cooperating or acting in parallel. The sources do not establish one leadership chosen to represent everyone affected by gender-based violence.

Everyday needs

Participants demanded protection from violence and the ability of women and LGBT+ people to live safely. Interviewees linked the Convention to access to justice and protection by police and courts. Their concern was whether those protections would work in daily life.^[4]

Power and accountability

The campaign challenged withdrawal by presidential decision and demanded that authorities investigate violence, protect survivors and apply safeguards effectively.^{[1][4]} Mor Çatı's 2023 report on the Opuz group of European Court of Human Rights cases described problems with protection orders, shelters and enforcement. It urged stronger measures and continued scrutiny of the state's compliance. These findings are the organization's assessment based on its casework and monitoring.^[6]

Institutional response

Withdrawal took effect on July 1, 2021, despite the campaign. On that day, police blocked a march in Istanbul and used tear gas and rubber bullets.^{[1][2]} The UN committee overseeing the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) urged Türkiye to reconsider. This international criticism did not itself restore membership of the Istanbul Convention.^[7]

What continued

Women's and LGBT+ organizations participated in Türkiye's June 2022 CEDAW review. A coalition of 20 organizations, including Mor Çatı, the Women's Solidarity Foundation, Women for Women's Human Rights, Kaos GL and the Turkish Women's Union, submitted a joint report. Other groups made separate submissions.^[8] Mor Çatı's October 2023 Opuz report documents continued legal monitoring after withdrawal.^[6] The We Will Stop Femicide Platform published a further monitoring report in June 2026, documenting its continued work on killings and suspicious deaths of women.^[9]

Across borders

CEDAW review and European supervision of the Opuz judgments were continuing international channels for civil-society evidence. They arise under different legal instruments from the Istanbul Convention. Withdrawal therefore did not eliminate every international route for scrutiny.^{[8][6]}

Sources

- [1] [Bianet — Police block women's march for İstanbul Convention, use tear gas, rubber bullets](#)
- [2] [Reuters — Women protest as Turkey quits violence-on-women treaty](#)
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MOV-064

Ghana: #FixTheCountry and campaigns against illegal mining

First protest included: August 2021

Case overview

The case begins with #FixTheCountry's August 4, 2021 demonstration and follows related civic organizing against illegal mining, known as galamsey. Democracy Hub's September 2024 protests and later environmental campaigns are identified separately where the organizers differ.^{[1][2][3]}

Young people and organizers

Young Ghanaians developed #FixTheCountry through social media to challenge economic hardship and demand accountable government.^[4] Democracy Hub organized particular anti-galamsey actions. Environmental organizations, labour groups and religious bodies also pressed for action. Their participation did not turn them into one organization.^[2]

How they organized and made decisions

#FixTheCountry combined online campaigning with street demonstrations.^[4] In September 2025, its convenor Oliver Barker-Vormawor announced a further anti-galamsey protest.^[3] The similarly named Fixing the Country Movement was a separate pro-NPP group that defended the government and disputed #FixTheCountry's claims in 2021. It should not be confused with the civic campaign or treated as part of the environmental coalition.^[5]

Everyday needs

The original campaign concerned jobs, living costs and public services.^[4] Environmental demands addressed polluted water, damaged forests and the effects of illegal mining on communities. In a CIVICUS interview, Pen Plus Bytes director Jeremiah Sam described calls for enforcement, restoration of damaged land and water, and community involvement in mining decisions. His account describes the wider environmental campaign, rather than a platform adopted by every #FixTheCountry participant.^[2]

Power and accountability

Civic and environmental groups sought action against those breaking mining laws and greater accountability from public agencies. Arrests during the September 2024 actions added demands to release protesters and protect peaceful participation. More than 50 people were arrested across those actions, while the reported court proceedings covered specific groups of defendants.^{[2][6]}

Institutional response

Courts remanded Democracy Hub protesters in 2024.^[6] In February 2025, GBC reported that the attorney general had filed notice in January discontinuing charges in the reported case. This does not establish that every separate proceeding against the activists ended.^[7] The government launched a special task force against illegal gold mining and smuggling in July 2025.^[8] In December, it revoked LI 2462, which had permitted mining in forest reserves. These were specific state actions, not evidence that damaged forests and water had been restored.^{[9][10]}

What continued

#FixTheCountry's 2025 protest call and A Rocha Ghana's response to the regulatory repeal show continued activity by named organizations. They also show that advocacy extended beyond a single march. The sources do not establish a shared leadership or a lasting improvement in every issue raised by the original campaign.^{[10][3]}

Across borders

The cited records focus on domestic organizing. CIVICUS's interview describes regional cooperation among Ghanaian civil-society organizations in general, but does not identify a specific overseas organization directing #FixTheCountry. That broader description should not be turned into a case-specific partnership claim.^[2]

Sources

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MOV-171

Sri Lanka: Aragalaya and the political changes that followed

First protest included: March 2022

Case overview

Aragalaya, meaning “the struggle,” brought together protests during the 2022 economic crisis. This case follows the uprising, the president’s resignation and subsequent civic and political developments through September 2026. Later elections and legislation are considered in their own right, rather than as decisions made by the original protest coalition.^{[1][2][3][4][5]}

Young people and organizers

Young people and students were central to mobilization, alongside civic groups, professionals, unions and informal networks. Their participation helped turn shortages and financial hardship into demands for changes in political leadership and the way the country was governed.^{[1][2]}

How they organized and made decisions

Encampments, marches, strikes and online communication connected different groups. Occupation of prominent public spaces made the campaign highly visible, while unions and student organizations mobilized through their own structures. There was no single body controlling every protest group or choosing the president’s successor.^[1]

Everyday needs

Participants demanded relief from shortages, high living costs and economic insecurity. The successor government pursued an IMF-supported programme and debt restructuring. Those measures addressed the financial crisis, but their existence alone does not establish that protesters obtained the fairer distribution and social protection they sought.^{[1][2][6]}

Power and accountability

The uprising demanded President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s resignation, accountability for mismanagement and a break with entrenched political privilege.^{[1][2]} State repression created further demands. The Inter University Students’ Federation organized protests seeking release of detained leaders Wasantha Mudalige and Siridhamma Thero, alongside other political prisoners.^[7]

Institutional response

Rajapaksa left the country and resigned in July 2022. Ranil Wickremesinghe succeeded him through the constitutional process. Authorities also used arrests, force and counterterrorism powers against protesters and student leaders.^{[1][2][8]} Following the NPP’s 2024 electoral victories, Parliament repealed former presidents’ statutory entitlements in September 2025 and parliamentary pensions in February 2026. These laws addressed particular privileges, without completing the wider reform agenda.^{[3][4][5]} A judicial constitutional amendment was still a proposal when opponents demonstrated against it on September 3, 2026. The government said it would reduce court delays, while critics warned about judicial independence. It had been introduced earlier, not on the day of the demonstration.^[5]

What continued

Some activists continued through civic work, organizing and electoral politics. The 2024 change of government reflected wider public rejection of the old political leadership. It did not give the winning party retrospective authority to speak for everyone who joined Aragalaya.^{[1][5]}

Across borders

The IMF programme and international human-rights scrutiny shaped the aftermath. These were distinct external processes: one concerned economic stabilization and the other state conduct. Neither made those institutions representatives of the protest movement.^{[8][6]}

Sources

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MOV-096

Italy: Non Una Di Meno and protests against violence against women

First protest included: November 2023

Case overview

The November 2023 protests followed the killing of Giulia Cecchettin. Rome high-school students held a sit-in on 20 November and called further school actions and participation in Non Una Di Meno's national demonstration on 25 November. The case follows the network's subsequent campaigns and legal developments through 2026.^{[1][2]}

Young people and organizers

Students and young women helped widen an established, intergenerational feminist movement. ANSA identifies OSA as an organizer of the school protests. Non Una Di Meno provided a national network linking local feminist assemblies and allies in workplaces and communities.^{[1][3]}

How they organized and made decisions

Local assemblies coordinate through national meetings and shared communications. Marches and feminist strikes bring together action on paid work, unpaid care and violence. These are participatory spaces for the people involved; they do not give the network authority to speak for every woman or demonstrator.^[3]

Everyday needs

The campaign connects protection from violence with the conditions that make it possible to leave abuse: support services, care and economic independence. Its wider feminist-strike agenda challenges insecurity at work and cuts to welfare. The 2023 student response also brought the issue directly into schools.^{[3][1]}

Power and accountability

Non Una Di Meno calls for bodily autonomy and effective protection against sexual violence. Its April 2026 statement demanded a rape law based on free and current consent and opposed the Bongiorno bill. A separate working-group discussion rejects the idea that longer prison sentences alone can address gender-based violence.^{[2][4]}

Institutional response

Law No. 181 of 2 December 2025 introduced the offence of femicide and additional victim-protection measures. This is a completed legal change. It does not show that Non Una Di Meno endorsed the law or that prevention and survivor services improved. The law itself requires annual reporting on its application.^{[5][4]}

What continued

The network's April 2026 call for demonstrations outside the Senate and in other cities shows continued organizing over consent legislation. It proves that actions were announced, rather than establishing that every planned event took place. Its working-group material also documents ongoing discussion of care, responses to violence and alternatives to a punishment-only approach.^{[2][4]}

Across borders

An account by movement participants documents international feminist-strike exchanges in 2019, including meetings in Valencia and participation by activists from other countries in the Verona assembly. These were actual exchanges among organizers; they did not create a single international leadership.^[3]

Sources

- [1] ANSA — Rome high-school students hold sit-in for Giulia Cecchettin and other victims
- [2] Non Una Di Meno — Call for consent-law actions, 7 April 2026
- [3] Viewpoint Magazine — Italy's feminist strike movement
- [4] Non Una Di Meno — Violence working group statement opposing a punitive-only femicide response, April 2025
- [5] Law 2 December 2025, No. 181 — Gazette text reproduced by Giurisprudenza Penale

MOV-053

France: far-right mobilization after the Crépol killing

First protest included: November 2023

Case overview

This case covers the far-right mobilization around Romans-sur-Isère in November 2023 after the fatal stabbing of Thomas in nearby Crépol. Later dissolution decisions and reporting on possible successor groups are updates to that episode.^{[1][2][3][4]}

Young people and organizers

Six people arrested at the November gathering were aged 18–25.^[5] Existing far-right networks were involved. The Interior Ministry identified suspected Division Martel involvement; that attribution should not be read as proof that the group directed every marcher.^[1]

How they organized and made decisions

Activists travelled from several towns to Romans-sur-Isère. Existing groups and online networks helped mobilize them, but the reporting does not identify a body chosen to represent everyone involved.^{[6][1]}

Everyday needs

Participants used the killing to promote claims that immigration and Muslims endangered public safety. Those were the protesters' claims, not findings about immigrant or Muslim communities.^[6]

Power and accountability

The mobilization included anti-Muslim rhetoric and attempts to confront residents of a neighbourhood associated with suspects in the killing. It sought punitive action outside the normal criminal process. Police, courts and government acted against this mobilization; the cited evidence does not show official acceptance of its exclusionary demands.^[1]

Institutional response

Police blocked the march and made arrests. Six participants received prison sentences of six to ten months. The government subsequently dissolved Division Martel on 6 December 2023. A separate decree dissolved Lyon Populaire on 12 June 2025. These were completed decisions against distinct organizations, rather than concessions to the protesters. The decrees alone do not establish how fully the bans were enforced.^{[1][2][3]}

What continued

In February 2026, Le Monde reported that authorities suspected Audace Lyon and Héritage Lyon of reconstituting dissolved groups. It described possible links to former members of Les Remparts and Lyon Populaire. This supports a qualified account of networks regrouping; it does not establish that each banned organization continued unchanged or that a common leadership emerged.^[4]

Across borders

Reuters reported that French Telegram users circulated footage of the Dublin riots and praised them. This supports a claim of cross-border inspiration and online circulation. It does not establish direct coordination between French and Irish organizers.^[6]

Sources

- [1] [Euronews — France moves to shut down far-right groups](#)
- [2] [Légifrance — Decree dissolving Division Martel, 6 December 2023](#)
- [3] [Légifrance — Decree dissolving Lyon Populaire, 12 June 2025](#)
- [4] [Le Monde — Alleged reconstitution of dissolved groups, 25 February 2026](#)
- [5] [The Guardian — Far-right protests after Thomas's killing](#)
- [6] [Reuters — French Far-right Protests After a Stabbing Drew on the Dublin Riots](#)

MOV-087

Indonesia: student action against Rohingya refugees in Aceh

First protest included: December 2023

Case overview

On 27 December 2023, students protested at Aceh's provincial parliament, then went to a shelter in Banda Aceh and forced Rohingya refugees to leave. This case covers that episode.^[1]

Young people and organizers

Students were central to the action. ANTARA reported participants from several campuses, mainly Universitas Abulyatama, and identified a field coordinator, T. Wariza Ismandar. A named coordinator is evidence of organization, without establishing authority over all students in Aceh.^[1]

How they organized and made decisions

After the parliamentary protest, participants moved to Balai Meuseuraya Aceh. They had vehicles ready and took approximately 137 refugees to the provincial Law and Human Rights Ministry office. ANTARA reported that the destination changed because the immigration office was under construction.^[1]

Everyday needs

Protesters claimed that refugee arrivals would bring social and economic problems. These were their assertions, rather than demonstrated harms caused by the refugees.^[2] Reuters reported UNHCR's assessment that online misinformation and hate speech had helped drive the attack.^[3]

Power and accountability

The students demanded that provincial lawmakers reject the refugees and that central government resolve the situation. The protest then became direct coercion against people in the shelter, including women and children.^[1]

Institutional response

AP reported that the attack forced authorities to relocate the refugees to another shelter. UNHCR condemned the attack and called for protection of refugees and humanitarian workers. Relocation following an attack is not evidence that government adopted a deportation policy.^[2]

What continued

The cited sources document the immediate protest and displacement. They do not establish that the participants built a lasting organization, secured a continuing role in migration decisions or achieved their wider demand to remove Rohingya refugees from Aceh.

Across borders

The refugees' journey from Myanmar and Bangladesh and UNHCR's involvement made this an international protection issue. That does not establish a cross-border alliance among the student protesters.^{[3][2]}

Sources

- [1] [ANTARA Aceh — Students move Rohingya refugees to the ministry office, 27 December 2023](#)
- [2] [Associated Press — Students in Aceh protest the arrival of Rohingya refugees](#)
- [3] [Reuters — Indonesian protesters storm refugee shelter calling for deportation of Rohingya](#)

MOV-113

Mexico: Ayotzinapa families and students seek truth and justice

First protest included: March 2024

Case overview

The campaign began after the disappearance of 43 Ayotzinapa teacher-training students in September 2014. The protests included here took place at the National Palace in March 2024 and in Chilpancingo in April 2024. The September 2025 anniversary demonstrations and 2026 legal developments are later updates. ^{[1][2][3][4]}

Young people and organizers

Ayotzinapa students and student-solidarity networks organize alongside the parents of the disappeared. Rights organizations, including Centro Prodh, support the families' legal work. Young people are part of the organizing core, while the parents retain a distinct role in directing their search for their children. ^{[5][4]}

How they organized and made decisions

Families and students combine marches, campus assemblies, public remembrance and legal action. They do not always agree on tactics: after protesters damaged the National Palace door in March 2024, Centro Prodh distanced itself from those acts and called for respectful dialogue. The episode should not be attributed to a unanimous campaign decision. ^{[5][1]}

Everyday needs

The families continue to seek their children and answers about what happened to them. For fellow students, the campaign also raises a basic question of safety: whether studying, travelling and organizing exposes young people to disappearance and lethal violence. ^{[5][4]}

Power and accountability

The campaign demands access to military records, independent investigation and responsibility for both the disappearances and obstruction of the investigation. The families' litigation specifically challenged the withholding of intelligence documents identified through the independent experts' work. ^[4]

Institutional response

Police used tear gas during the March 2024 palace protest. ^[1] On 19 February 2026, a federal court ordered disclosure of missing military records, including an estimated 853 pages; Centro Prodh reported the ruling on 4 March. This was a judicial order, rather than proof that the records were delivered. ^[4] In August 2026, prosecutors announced former Guerrero governor Ángel Aguirre's arrest over alleged evidence destruction. He had previously denied wrongdoing. An arrest is not a conviction. The reviewed sources do not establish full disclosure or final accountability for all 43 disappearances. ^[6]

What continued

The September 2025 anniversary march brought together parents, current students, about 20 teacher-training colleges, search groups and civil organizations, according to El Sol de México reporting reproduced by Mexico Solidarity Media. Continued litigation in 2026 provides further evidence that the campaign has sustained its organization over time. ^{[7][4]}

Across borders

The families used the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and its independent expert group, GIEI. The 2020 agreement reinstating the experts was signed by the state and representatives of the students and families. It assigned investigative assistance and reporting duties, rather than leadership of the domestic campaign. ^[8]

Sources

- [1] Reuters — Protesters knock down door of Mexico's presidential palace
- [2] Associated Press — Ayotzinapa-linked protest in Chilpancingo, 8 April 2024
- [3] Associated Press — Protesters breach a military-base gate over the 43 missing Ayotzinapa students
- [4] Centro Prodh — Poder Judicial de la Federación ordena a la Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional entregar documentos faltantes en el caso Ayotzinapa
- [5] International Catalan Institute for Peace — From rage to organisation. Mexican youth in the reconstruction of peace
- [6] Reuters — Former Mexican governor arrested for allegedly destroying evidence tied to 43 missing students
- [7] Mexico Solidarity Media — Ayotzinapa March: 11 Years After, Parents of Students Fed Up With Lack of Justice
- [8] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights — Ayotzinapa investigation and state cooperation

MOV-082

India: examination protests and the Cockroach Janta Party campaign

First protest included: June 2024

Case overview

This case connects the June 2024 protests over examination irregularities with the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) campaign that emerged in May–June 2026. Developments from July to September 2026 are updates. The two periods concern similar problems, but involve different organizations.^{[1][2][3]}

Young people and organizers

Students and examination candidates were central. In 2024, the Students' Federation of India (SFI) and Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP) held separate demonstrations.^[1] AISA called a national strike; AIDSO issued its own demands, while NSUI called for an inquiry and the Indian Youth Congress protested.^{[4][5][6][7]} Abhijeet Dipke founded the new CJP platform in 2026.^[2]

How they organized and made decisions

The 2024 actions included campus and street protests, petitions and demands for independent investigation. CJP combined online satire with a sustained protest at Jantar Mantar and negotiations with ministers. The evidence does not establish a single coalition across the two periods or authorize CJP to speak retrospectively for the earlier organizations.^{[1][2][3][8]}

Everyday needs

Candidates sought fair examinations and reliable routes into education and work. Leaks and repeated tests cost families time, money and confidence. The 2026 protesters also sought compensation for families of students whose suicides they linked to examination distress. This demand should be distinguished from a finding about the cause of each death.^{[9][10]}

Power and accountability

The demands included investigation of leaks, changes to the National Testing Agency and stronger safeguards against cheating.^[1] In 2026, CJP sought the education minister's resignation and protection from police abuse. Amnesty International called for an independent investigation into reported excessive force against demonstrators.^[10]

Institutional response

Some candidates received retests in 2024.^[4] In 2026, the cancelled NEET examination was held again in June, according to the minister's account. Dharmendra Pradhan resigned on 25 July after sustained protest. The cabinet had also approved a draft anti-leak bill; approval of a draft does not establish its later enforcement.^[3] Reporting on 8 September said the Supreme Court had quashed cases against participants in the 20–25 July protests, with an exception for people with prior criminal records. It also reported that a separate notice to student Akshat Tripathi, issued on 4 September, was revoked the following day.^[11]

What continued

CJP cancelled its planned 5 September march after renewed government assurances about protest-related cases. Its August "School Thik Karo" campaign extended attention to government-school conditions. These activities show continued organizing, while the platform's long-term durability and accountability to supporters remain untested.^{[8][12]}

Across borders

The litigation and negotiations described here took place within India. Amnesty's scrutiny provided international attention to protest rights, but does not establish a cross-border alliance of student organizations.^{[10][11]}

Sources

- [1] [The Times of India — Student protests over examination leaks and testing integrity](#)
- [2] [Reuters — Founder of viral Indian Gen Z account alleges crackdown, threats](#)
- [3] [The Indian Express — Dharmendra Pradhan resigns amid CJP examination protests](#)
- [4] [India Today — Left students' group calls for 2-day nationwide strike over NEET row](#)
- [5] [AIDSO — Statements on NEET irregularities, June 2024](#)
- [6] [Indian National Congress — NEET medical admission irregularities, 2024](#)
- [7] [NDTV — Youth Congress Members Detained Near Parliament Amid Protest Over NEET](#)
- [8] [The Indian Express — CJP calls off the planned 5 September march, 2 September 2026](#)
- [9] [Reuters — Examination leaks and the Cockroach Janta Party protests, 2026](#)
- [10] [Amnesty International — India: Crackdown on peaceful protesters in New Delhi raises serious human rights concerns](#)
- [11] [The Indian Express — Police withdraw notice to CJP student, 8 September 2026](#)
- [12] [The Times of India — School Thik Karo campaign, 31 August 2026](#)

MOV-104

Kenya: Gen Z protests over taxes and police accountability

First protest included: June 2024

Case overview

The sequence begins with the June 2024 Finance Bill protests, followed by demonstrations against abductions in December 2024 and police-accountability protests in June 2025. The later protests built on anger at repression as well as unresolved economic grievances.^{[1][2][3]}

Young people and organizers

Young Kenyans were central to decentralized organizing across social media and local networks.^[4] Siasa Place, lawyers, families and rights organizations contributed in different ways. Siasa Place's Nerima Wako publicly demanded the release of abducted young people during the December 2024 protests. These organizations did not become a single leadership for everyone involved.^{[5][3]}

How they organized and made decisions

Online explanations of the bill, crowdfunding and street demonstrations widened participation. A joint statement by youth organizations supported the protesters while recognizing their independence.^[3] Later accounts describe continued digital advocacy and community work. The movement's decentralized structure enabled participation but left no single body able to settle disagreements or negotiate for all supporters.^{[6][7]}

Everyday needs

The campaign opposed taxes that would increase everyday costs and demanded jobs and better public services. After killings, abductions and arrests, safety from state violence became an equally urgent concern. Human Rights Watch documented continuing abuses during the 2025 protests, including those following Albert Ojwang's death in police custody.^{[8][2]}

Power and accountability

Protesters challenged corruption, wasteful government spending and the fairness of the tax burden. Families and rights groups sought investigation and prosecution for deaths and disappearances.^{[8][2]} A Georgetown analysis describes criminal groups attacking or disrupting protests. These were hostile actors; they do not establish another representative component of the youth movement.^[9]

Institutional response

President William Ruto declined to sign the Finance Bill. On 25 July 2024, the National Assembly deleted every clause, rejecting the bill in full. The immediate demand to stop that bill was therefore achieved.^[10] This did not settle the broader economic or police-accountability agenda: Human Rights Watch's 2026 report describes limited investigations and continuing impunity.^[2]

What continued

Families were still seeking answers in June 2026.^[11] Siasa Place's own account describes continuing civic education, digital-security training, support for community organizations and ways for young people to comment on legislation. That establishes the activity of a named organization, rather than a measured increase in the membership or authority of the whole protest movement.^[7]

Across borders

Semafor reported that young people in Uganda and Nigeria drew lessons from Kenya, with Kenyans sharing protest experiences online.^[12] Siasa Place describes exchanges with Yiaga in Nigeria and work with Africtivistes on repression in Senegal.^[7] Separately, Human Rights Watch addressed the Kenyan government and IMF about fair taxation and rights safeguards. This was a specific international advocacy route; the source does not establish an IMF concession negotiated by the protesters.^[8]

Sources

- [1] Reuters — Police in Kenya fire teargas at protest over alleged abductions
- [2] Human Rights Watch — World Report 2026: Kenya
- [3] Siasa Place — Joint statement by youth organizations, 28 June 2024
- [4] The Guardian — Kenya's youth-driven protest movement at crossroads as it considers future
- [5] eNCA / AFP — Kenya detains protesters rallying against abductions, 30 December 2024
- [6] Democracy in Africa — Kenya's Gen Z Movement Fighting for Transparency and Accountability in Governance
- [7] ICIP — Digital democracy and cyberactivism: the role of Siasa Place
- [8] Human Rights Watch — Kenya/IMF: Align Economic Reform with Rights, 16 July 2024
- [9] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs — The Gen-Z Uprising in Kenya: Digital Dissent and the Struggle for a New Civic Order
- [10] National Assembly of Kenya — Finance Bill rejected after presidential reservations, July 2024
- [11] Al Jazeera — Two years on, Kenyan families still seek justice after Gen Z protests
- [12] Semafor — Kenya-style protests spread to other African nations, 30 July 2024

MOV-017

Bangladesh: from the quota uprising to the democratic transition

First protest included: July 2024

Case overview

The case begins with the July 2024 uprising over public-sector job quotas and follows linked mobilizations during the transition. These include the December 2024 March for Unity and later disputes over political representation and the July Charter. Developments through September 2026 are treated as updates to that sequence.^{[1][2][3]}

Young people and organizers

Students Against Discrimination led the uprising. It later organized with the Jatiya Nagorik Committee, a separate civic platform. Some student leaders entered the interim government and helped establish the National Citizen Party (NCP); others organized outside the party. These bodies had overlapping participants, but none acquired authority to represent everyone who joined the uprising.^{[1][2][4][5]}

How they organized and made decisions

Campus and street networks sustained the uprising. During the transition, student coordinators, civic platforms and new party structures made their own decisions about marches, negotiations and alliances. The NCP's crowdfunding and membership arrangements show the development of a party organization, rather than a common decision-making system for the whole uprising.^{[1][2][6]}

Everyday needs

Students first sought fair access to government employment. Lethal repression made personal safety and the release of detainees urgent demands.^[7] At the March for Unity, speakers also called for lower prices, action against market manipulation and improved law and order. These were published demands, rather than proof that living conditions subsequently improved.^[2]

Power and accountability

Demands expanded to Sheikh Hasina's departure, justice for the crackdown, institutional reform and a new constitutional settlement. The July Charter became one route for negotiating reforms, with disagreements over its terms and implementation.^{[1][2][8]}

Institutional response

On 21 July 2024, the Supreme Court reduced quotas and directed that 93% of government jobs be filled on merit. Hasina left office in August, and an interim government included former student leaders.^{[7][1]} The NCP initially withheld its signature from the October 2025 July Charter, then signed on 16 February 2026

subject to full implementation of the referendum verdict. That later signature supersedes the earlier refusal.^{[3][9]} The party won six parliamentary seats in February 2026.^[10] These changes do not establish completion of the wider reform and justice agenda.

What continued

The movement both developed new organizations and fragmented. In January 2026, former NCP members and other uprising activists announced plans for another platform, including rotating leadership; that article reports a planned launch.^[4] BRAC BIGD's 2025 study adds wider context: its research on youth-led organizations found opportunities after the uprising alongside funding, inclusion and security barriers. Its survey covered 395 organizations, complemented by interviews and focus groups. Most were formal organizations; individual activists and informal protest actions were excluded, so it does not measure the whole uprising.^[11]

Across borders

The sources used here do not establish a specific cross-border organizing alliance or an international body that decided the transition settlement. International coverage of the uprising should not be treated as evidence of such a route.

Sources

- [1] Reuters — Students who ousted Hasina prepare to launch a political party
- [2] Dhaka Tribune — March for Unity sets out July Revolution demands
- [3] The Business Standard — NCP signs July Charter, 16–17 February 2026
- [4] The Daily Star — Former NCP members plan a new platform, January 2026
- [5] The Daily Star — July uprising: Nagorik Committee, student body to be revamped
- [6] The Daily Star — NCP crowdfunding and official domain, 4 June 2025
- [7] Reuters — Bangladesh court scraps most job quotas, 21 July 2024
- [8] ConstitutionNet / International IDEA — July Charter and constitutional reforms in Bangladesh
- [9] Prothom Alo — NCP signing subject to full implementation, February 2026
- [10] Al Jazeera — What comes next for Bangladesh's student-led NCP
- [11] BRAC BIGD — Understanding the Youth-Led Civil Society Landscape in Bangladesh, 2025 study

MOV-088

Indonesia: student executive networks challenge government policy

First protest included: August 2024

Case overview

The sequence covers the August 2024 “Emergency Warning” election-law protests, February 2025 “Dark Indonesia” demonstrations, the 2025 “17+8” demands campaign and June 2026 “Heading towards a Bankrupt Indonesia” actions. An August 2026 action is a later update.^{[1][2][3][4][5]}

Young people and organizers

University student executive bodies, known as BEM, were central. They included BEM SI networks and BEM Universitas Indonesia (UI), alongside separate campus organizations. In June 2026, BEM UI chair Yatalathof Ma'shum Imawan coordinated with faculty bodies and students from IPB, PNJ, Pancasila, Gunadarma and other campuses. IDN Times reported more than 700 participants; 1,500 was an advance organizer target.^{[3][4][6]}

How they organized and made decisions

Campus executives coordinated demonstrations and published demands. Each organization spoke for its own participants. For September 2025, BEM UI and Atma Jaya announced a parliamentary protest seeking delivery of the wider 17+8 platform. This source establishes their organizing call, rather than proving that every announced action took place.^[3]

Everyday needs

The February 2025 protests opposed budget cuts that students feared would undermine education and social support; the government disputed that education would be harmed.^[2] In June 2026, BEM UI demanded lower food and fuel prices, an end to budget waste, and cancellation of the free nutritious meals and Red-and-White village cooperative programmes.^[4]

Power and accountability

The 2024 protesters demanded respect for Constitutional Court election rulings. Later demands included ending the military's expansion into civilian life and requiring President Prabowo to acknowledge government mistakes. These demands belonged to the relevant campaigns; they should not be presented as one unchanged platform across every year.^{[1][4]}

Institutional response

Parliament dropped the disputed election-law revision in August 2024. The election commission then promulgated Regulation 10/2024 on 25 August, changing regional candidacy rules. This put the immediate electoral-rule response into effect.^{[7][8]} Other demands had different outcomes. In June 2026, police and military blockades restricted the students' route; the demonstration later ended peacefully. The case does not establish a settlement of the wider fiscal and civilian-control demands.^{[4][9]}

What continued

BEM UI and other campus bodies held a further public campaign during Car Free Day on 28 June 2026. Organizers said their June demands had not been met.^[9] The August action added demands on land reform, disaster response and regional autonomy. Repeated action shows continuing organization, without proving that all campus coalitions had merged or increased their membership.^[5]

Across borders

ISEAS researchers traced the use of the One Piece pirate flag in Indonesia's 2025 protests and its subsequent adoption in Nepal and on Philippine campuses. This is evidence of a protest symbol spreading across borders, rather than shared foreign direction or a joint decision-making body.^[10]

Sources

- [1] [Reuters — Indonesia shelves plan to revise election law as protests rage](#)
- [2] [Reuters — Students lead 'Dark Indonesia' protests against budget cuts](#)
- [3] [IDN Times — BEM UI and Atma Jaya action on the 17+8 demands, 9 September 2025](#)
- [4] [IDN Times — 8 Fakta Aksi Demo Mahasiswa di Bundaran HI: Menuju Indonesia Bangkrut](#)
- [5] [Schoolmedia — Eight demands of BEM UI's 18 August 2026 action](#)
- [6] [Warta Ekonomi — BEM UI target for 12 June action, 12 June 2026](#)
- [7] [ANTARA — DPR backs down on local polls law revision amid protests](#)
- [8] [KPU — Regulation 10/2024, promulgated 25 August 2024](#)
- [9] [IDN Times — BEM UI completed solidarity action on 28 June, 29 June 2026](#)
- [10] [ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute / FULCRUM — One Piece Flag, Multiple Protests, 2 October 2025](#)

MOV-157

Serbia: student assemblies seek accountability after Novi Sad

First protest included: November 2024

Case overview

The case covers protests following the November 2024 Novi Sad station-canopy collapse, the continuing student campaign and the November 2025 General Staff heritage-site protest in Belgrade. Sixteen people died following the Novi Sad collapse. The Belgrade dispute concerned a different site, but Students in Blockade's later court-support call establishes an organizational connection.^{[1][2][3]}

Young people and organizers

Students were central. Students in Blockade, campus assemblies and allied civic groups organized occupations, marches and public demands. Teachers, lawyers and other supporters joined the wider campaign.^{[4][5]}

How they organized and made decisions

Faculty assemblies, called plenums, voted on actions. Working groups handled strategy, donations and security, while universities coordinated across cities. Spokespeople rotated. These arrangements allowed participating students to make collective decisions without creating one leader for every supporter.^[4]

Everyday needs

The published demands connect safe public infrastructure with access to education. They seek a 20% increase in higher-education funding and protection of hospital patients' privacy. The linked Belgrade

campaign sought to protect public land and architectural heritage from a luxury redevelopment scheme; the evidence does not establish a housing-delivery demand or outcome.^{[5][2]}

Power and accountability

Students sought complete reconstruction records, prosecution of attacks on students and teachers, removal of implicated public officials, and dismissal of protest-related charges. They also demanded investigation of the unexplained disturbance during the 15 March 2025 silence. That demand does not establish that a sonic weapon was used. Later calls sought early parliamentary elections.^{[5][6]}

Institutional response

Authorities released documents and opened criminal proceedings, but students disputed the completeness of the disclosures.^{[5][4]} Parliament confirmed Prime Minister Miloš Vučević's resignation in March 2025 after an attack on students.^[7] UN experts raised concerns about repression and pressure on universities.^[1] On 8 September 2026, President Aleksandar Vučić said the parliamentary vote would be held on 25 October, with the formal decision expected the following day. At the review cutoff, this was a stated election date, not a completed election or fulfilment of the wider accountability demands.^[6]

What continued

Student assemblies sustained organizing across the campaign. In April 2026, Students in Blockade called supporters to a General Staff court hearing, following an earlier gathering in February. This connects the heritage dispute to the student network while preserving the distinct issues in the two cases.^[3] Continuing activity does not give students control over election administration or authority to speak for all opposition groups.

Across borders

In April 2025, student cyclists reached Strasbourg to seek European attention to their demands. Serbian diaspora members and French students welcomed them. This was a concrete international advocacy and solidarity effort, without transferring domestic decision-making authority to supporters abroad.^[8]

Sources

- [1] [UN independent experts — Communication on Serbia, 26 January 2026](#)
- [2] [Peoples Dispatch — Belgrade Protests Plan to Turn Historic Nato Bombing Site into Kushner Luxury Hotel](#)
- [3] [Mašina — Students in Blockade call a General Staff court action, 14 April 2026](#)
- [4] [Reuters — How Serbia's students turned tragedy into a national movement for change](#)
- [5] [Students in Blockade — Published demands \(Serbian\)](#)
- [6] [Reuters — Vučić says parliamentary vote will be on 25 October, 8 September 2026](#)
- [7] [Government of Serbia — Parliament confirms Prime Minister Miloš Vučević's resignation](#)
- [8] [Associated Press — Serbian students arrive in Strasbourg, 15 April 2025](#)

MOV-167

South Korea: protests against Yoon and martial law

First protest included: November 2024

Case overview

The case begins with November 2024 protests over political scandals, including demands to investigate First Lady Kim Keon-hee. It then follows the much larger campaign against President Yoon Suk Yeol's December martial-law declaration and for his removal. The pro-Yoon campaign is a separate case, MOV-168.^{[1][2]}

Young people and organizers

Students and young women helped shape the demonstrations, using K-pop light sticks, songs and fan networks to draw people in. The Student Union Forum organized a December march, and student councils from 44 universities signed a joint statement demanding impeachment.^{[3][4]} They worked within a wider coalition that included Candlelight Action, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions and the BISANG Action for Yoon Out & Social Reform coalition.^[5]

How they organized and made decisions

Student councils issued statements and organized marches; civic and labor groups coordinated repeated rallies. BISANG Action brought together more than 1,500 organizations. These were several sources of leadership, rather than a single youth organization speaking for all participants.^{[5][3]}

Everyday needs

The demands documented here centered on constitutional government and political accountability. They do not establish a shared programme on jobs, income or public services.^[3]

Power and accountability

Protesters demanded an end to martial law, Yoon's removal and legal accountability. Students linked their right to study and live freely to the protection of democracy. Martial law itself threatened political activity and press freedom, bringing state repression directly into the dispute.^{[3][2]}

Institutional response

After the National Assembly voted to require martial law to be lifted, Yoon and the government lifted martial law.^[2] Parliament impeached Yoon, and the Constitutional Court removed him on 4 April 2025. Lee Jae Myung began his presidential term on 4 June after the election.^{[6][7]} Yoon received a life sentence for insurrection on 19 February 2026; an appeal was expected.^[8] These were decisions by public institutions, supported by public pressure; protesters did not exercise the institutions' legal powers.

What continued

BISANG Action ended its main activities on 10 June 2025. A committee formed that day to preserve meeting records, citizens' contributions and other campaign materials. This documents a transition into archival work, not the uninterrupted operation of the whole protest coalition.^{[9][10]} In July 2026, President Lee awarded four demonstrators for their contribution to defending democracy.^[11]

Across borders

The crisis drew international attention. The sources used here do not establish an overseas organization directing the anti-Yoon coalition or a shared international decision-making body.^[2]

Sources

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- [3] [The Korea Herald — Anti-Yoon protests after the martial-law declaration](#)
- [4] [Reuters — K-pop light sticks fire up impeachment protests, 10 December 2024](#)
- [5] [ACLEd — Q&A: Who are the pro- and anti-Yoon groups leading demonstrations in South Korea?](#)
- [6] [Constitutional Court of Korea — Case 2024 8, decision of 4 April 2025](#)
- [7] [Korea.net — Lee Jae Myung sworn in as president after the 2025 election](#)
- [8] [The Guardian — Yoon sentenced to life imprisonment, 19 February 2026](#)
- [9] [Emergency Action archive committee — Formation and archival mandate](#)
- [10] [Pressian — Emergency Action ends its main activities, 11 June 2025](#)
- [11] [The Korea Herald — Lee awards demonstrators who protested martial law, 17 July 2026](#)

MOV-168

South Korea: the pro-Yoon counter-movement

First protest included: December 2024

Case overview

This case follows pro-Yoon rallies during the martial-law and impeachment crisis from December 2024 to April 2025, with later activity by particular supporters. It remains separate from the anti-Yoon campaign, MOV-167, because the two sides sought opposing outcomes.^[1]

Young people and organizers

Young conservative men participated visibly, although older supporters remained prominent. Conservative churches, the Liberal Unification Party, Sarang Jeil Church, party-linked figures and online influencers mobilized supporters through different channels.^{[1][2]} The participation of young men was especially visible in the January 2025 attack on the Seoul Western District Court.^[3]

How they organized and made decisions

Organizers used rallies, church networks and online broadcasts. Some supporters gathered outside Yoon's residence to obstruct efforts to detain him. Reuters documented contacts between an anti-feminist YouTuber, Bae In-kyu, and People Power Party lawmaker Yoon Sang-hyeon.^[2] These connections show cooperation among particular actors; they do not establish a common leadership body for the whole campaign.

Everyday needs

The published demands reviewed here focus on Yoon’s presidency and political legitimacy. They do not establish a shared demand for improved income, education or public services.^[4]

Power and accountability

Supporters opposed impeachment and sought to keep Yoon in office. Anti-communist and anti-China rhetoric, together with unsubstantiated election-fraud claims, featured in the campaign. These are recorded as supporters’ claims, not as evidence that an election was fraudulent.^[4]

Institutional response

After a court approved Yoon’s detention, supporters attacked the Seoul Western District Court on 19 January 2025. Police arrested participants; the Korea Times reported substantial involvement by men in their twenties and thirties.^[3] On 4 April, the Constitutional Court removed Yoon. That decision defeated the campaign’s central objective of preserving his presidency.^[5]

What continued

Supporters continued gathering outside court during Yoon’s criminal proceedings in January 2026.^[6] In March, MBC reported that pro-Yoon activists were participating successfully in the People Power Party’s youth candidate-selection process. This demonstrates continued political activity by named components, not that they won office or represented every pro-Yoon network.^[7]

Across borders

Some demonstrators used the US slogan “Stop the Steal” and sought Donald Trump’s attention. This shows borrowing of political language and an appeal for foreign support; the cited reporting does not establish that such support was received.^{[2][4]}

Sources

- [1] [ACLEED — Q&A: Who are the pro- and anti-Yoon groups leading demonstrations in South Korea?](#)
- [2] [Reuters — South Korea's embattled leader Yoon finds allies among young conservative men](#)
- [3] [The Korea Times — New face of far right: What led young Korean men to vandalize court?](#)
- [4] [Korea JoongAng Daily — Young conservative participation in pro-Yoon rallies](#)
- [5] [Constitutional Court of Korea — Case 2024 8, removal decision of 4 April 2025](#)
- [6] [Associated Press — Court proceedings and Yoon supporters, 16 January 2026](#)
- [7] [MBC — Young pro-Yoon activist and party electoral route, 24 March 2026](#)

MOV-002

Albania: opposition to the TikTok ban

First protest included: March 2025

Case overview

The case covers the 15 March 2025 protest in Tirana against the TikTok ban and the separate legal challenge to the same restriction. The government presented the ban as a child-safety measure; opponents challenged its effects on free expression before the general election.^{[1][2][3]}

Young people and organizers

The Democratic Party and its youth organization convened the street protest. Democratic youth leader Besart Xhaferri argued that the closure served the government’s electoral interests. Young participants were given a platform, but their participation does not mean that the party represented Albanian young people or all TikTok users.^{[4][3][5]}

How they organized and made decisions

Opposition and youth-wing organizers used a public rally and speeches. BIRN Albania and the Association of Journalists of Albania pursued constitutional litigation. These were separate routes against the same ban; the sources do not identify shared leadership or joint decisions between the party protest and the legal applicants.^{[6][4][5]}

Everyday needs

The evidence centers on access to expression and information, and on whether the ban went further than necessary to protect children. It does not establish a separate shared demand on income or public-service delivery.^{[1][6]}

Power and accountability

Protesters alleged political censorship. Media and digital-rights organizations questioned whether a blanket ban was lawful, necessary and proportionate. The constitutional case asked the court to review the restriction, rather than giving protesters authority over platform regulation. ^{[1][6][3]}

Institutional response

Access to TikTok was restored in February 2026. The government cited safety measures agreed with the platform; Reuters reported that TikTok declined to comment on those details. ^[7] On 11 March, the Constitutional Court found the blanket ban unconstitutional. BIRN's account says the court recognized child protection as a legitimate aim but found the restriction lacked an adequate legal basis and was disproportionate. ^{[6][8]} Restoration preceded the judgment, so the judgment should not be described as the act that reopened TikTok.

What continued

BIRN and the journalists' association completed their constitutional challenge even after the ban was lifted. SCiDEV welcomed the judgment in March 2026 and stressed the importance of protecting expression in future digital regulation. This is evidence of continuing legal and rights advocacy, not a new organization representing every protest participant. ^{[6][9]}

Across borders

The European Federation of Journalists publicly opposed the ban. That is documented international advocacy; it does not establish an overseas body directing the Albanian protest or litigation. ^[1]

Sources

- [1] [European Federation of Journalists — Albania: TikTok ban threatens freedom of expression ahead of general elections](#)
- [2] [Reuters — Albania starts turning off TikTok amid concern over youth violence](#)
- [3] [Associated Press — Albanian opposition protests the TikTok ban](#)
- [4] [Deutsche Welle — Protest in Tirana against Albania's TikTok ban](#)
- [5] [Shqiptarja — Democratic youth leader Besart Xhaferri explains the protest against the TikTok closure](#)
- [6] [BIRN — BIRN Albania wins landmark Constitutional Court case](#)
- [7] [Reuters — TikTok returns to Albania after government-imposed ban](#)
- [8] [Reuters — One-year TikTok ban unconstitutional, 11 March 2026](#)
- [9] [SCiDEV — Response to the TikTok judgment, 11 March 2026](#)

MOV-187

Ukraine: defending independent anti-corruption agencies

First protest included: July 2025

Case overview

In July 2025, demonstrators opposed a law that placed Ukraine's main anti-corruption bodies under greater control of the prosecutor general. The agencies were the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO). The case follows the protests, the legal reversal and later scrutiny of these institutions. ^{[1][2]}

Young people and organizers

Young people were prominent in the street demonstrations, alongside older participants and people in military uniform. Informal protest networks and established watchdogs contributed in different ways. The Anti-Corruption Action Center (AntAC) publicly assessed the proposed reversal; Transparency International Ukraine continued to defend the agencies' independence. ^{[1][2][3]}

How they organized and made decisions

Demonstrations spread across Kyiv and other cities, while civic organizations explained the risks of political interference. Protesters called for the law to be overturned. Parliament and the president retained the power to change the law; the evidence does not establish one body chosen to speak for everyone in the streets. ^{[1][2]}

Everyday needs

The central demand concerned the independence of institutions investigating and prosecuting corruption. The sources do not establish a separate shared programme on wages, housing or services. ^{[1][2]}

Power and accountability

Participants wanted investigators and prosecutors protected from political interference. Some connected this directly to Ukraine's democratic future and its goal of joining the European Union. These concerns went beyond replacing an individual officeholder.^[1]

Institutional response

On 31 July 2025, parliament passed and President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law restoring the agencies' independence. It entered into force on 1 August.^[1] A European Commission report published in June 2026 says it worked with Ukrainian authorities to address the independence concerns before further financial assistance was paid.^[4] Separately, Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko submitted his resignation on 7 September 2026, citing political conflict. That submission should not be described as completed dismissal or attributed to the July 2025 movement.^[5]

What continued

Transparency International Ukraine's August 2026 account describes renewed protests in July 2026 against pressure on anti-corruption institutions. This is an organization's report of continued public scrutiny. It does not establish that the temporary 2025 street coalition became a permanent representative body.^[3]

Across borders

European officials reinforced the demand for independent anti-corruption institutions through accession conditions and financial-assistance discussions. The Commission's report documents its involvement. Ukrainian protesters, Ukrainian lawmakers and EU institutions each had different roles and decision-making powers.^[4]

Sources

- [1] [The Kyiv Independent — Following street protests, Zelensky signs law restoring independence of anti-graft bodies](#)
- [2] [Reuters — Zelenskiy vows to protect Ukraine's anti-corruption agencies, bows to protests](#)
- [3] [Transparency International Ukraine — Anti-corruption record and 2026 follow-up](#)
- [4] [European Commission — 2026 review of Ukraine's anti-corruption institutional safeguards](#)
- [5] [The Kyiv Independent — Prosecutor general submits resignation, 7 September 2026](#)

MOV-142

Philippines: protests over flood-control corruption

First protest included: September 2025

Case overview

The case covers the September 2025 anti-corruption demonstrations, including the 21 September rallies, and later student actions. Anger centered on missing or substandard flood-control projects and the public money allegedly diverted from them.^{[1][2]}

Young people and organizers

Youth Against Kurakot, Akbayan Youth, student councils, civic organizations and church groups organized different actions. Youth Against Kurakot lead convenor Khylla Meneses publicly pressed for investigation, prosecution and disclosure of officials' wealth. Students played a central organizing role, while the wider campaign included several generations and social groups.^{[3][4][1]}

How they organized and made decisions

Campus walkouts, street marches, noise barrages and social media connected public anger to specific demands. Kabataan party-list, Gabriela Women's Party and Bahaghari joined October protests; Akbayan, Tindig Pilipinas and Youth Against Kurakot organized a separate noise barrage. These named groups should be distinguished rather than treated as one organization.^[3]

Everyday needs

Students explicitly demanded better public services, especially education. Their case against corruption was therefore also a claim about how public resources should improve daily life. A participant interviewed by CIVICUS linked mobilization to flood damage, the cost of studying and transport expenses.^{[3][1]}

Power and accountability

Organizers called for investigation and punishment of those responsible, public access to officials' asset declarations and greater openness in budget decisions. Youth groups also demanded the release of detained protesters and accountability for alleged police brutality after 21 September.^{[3][5]}

Institutional response

Executive Order 94 created the Independent Commission for Infrastructure on 11 September 2025, before the 21 September rallies. Its creation cannot be attributed to those later demonstrations.^[6] Marcos also replaced Public Works Secretary Manuel Bonoan with Vince Dizon.^[7] The commission submitted findings on 13 March 2026 and ended work on 31 March. PCIJ reported in July that at least 45 people faced charges, with other cases still being investigated.^[2] Authorities arrested former House speaker Martin Romualdez on 7 September in the flood-control plunder case.^[8] Charges and arrests are not convictions; these reports do not establish full recovery of the money involved.

What continued

October 2025 student walkouts demonstrate continued mobilization. ABS-CBN reported another youth march from UP Diliman to Ateneo on 22 July 2026.^{[3][9]} The Olof Palme International Center says collaboration between Akbayan Youth and Sweden's SSU strengthened organizing, political education and inclusive leadership. This is a partner's assessment of one component, not an independent measure of the whole campaign.^[4]

Across borders

The Akbayan Youth–SSU partnership is a specific organizational link. A CIVICUS interviewee also described following protests in Bangladesh, Indonesia and Nepal and the use of One Piece imagery. Shared inspiration does not establish common international leadership.^{[4][1]}

Sources

- [1] CIVICUS Lens — PHILIPPINES: 'Change doesn't come all at once, but in accumulated milestones'
- [2] PCIJ — One year after the flood-control speech, 26 July 2026
- [3] Philstar — Student walkouts and education/public-service demands, 18 October 2025
- [4] Olof Palme International Center — Akbayan Youth and SSU collaboration, 23 April 2026
- [5] ABS-CBN News — Youth groups condemn police 'brutality' in Sept. 21 rallies, demand release of detained protesters
- [6] Philippine Information Agency — Executive Order 94 creating the infrastructure commission
- [7] Presidential Communications Office — Bonoan resigns and Vince Dizon becomes Public Works secretary
- [8] The Philippine Star — Romualdez arrested in flood-control plunder case, 7 September 2026
- [9] ABS-CBN — Youth groups march from UP Diliman to Ateneo, 22 July 2026

MOV-108

Madagascar: protests over services and political change

First protest included: September 2025

Case overview

The protests began on 25 September 2025 over water shortages and power cuts, then widened into demands for political change. The case follows the youth campaign, Rajoelina's departure, military succession and later disputes with the new authorities.^{[1][2]}

Young people and organizers

Students and urban young people were prominent, with Gen Z Madagascar and the Leo Délestage ("Fed Up With Electricity Cut-Offs") campaign using digital networks and street action. Workers and provincial residents also joined. Later reporting distinguishes Gen Z 261 from Gen Z Madagascar officielle; neither name should stand for every participant.^{[1][3][4]}

How they organized and made decisions

Social media and messaging helped coordinate protests across locations.^[1] A Youth Empowerment Madagascar activist interviewed by CIVICUS described regional committees and cooperation with civic organizations. This is a participant's account, rather than proof of a single leadership structure accepted by all branches.^[5] The pro-Rajoelina counter-rally and the CAPSAT military unit acted through separate political and military channels.^[1]

Everyday needs

Reliable water and electricity were the initial demands. The campaign also raised unemployment, living costs and inadequate services.^[1] The CIVICUS interviewee reported shorter power cuts under the new authorities, while saying shortages continued. That describes partial improvement from one participant's perspective, not nationwide service restoration.^[5]

Power and accountability

Repression broadened demands to Rajoelina's resignation, protection of protesters, release of detainees and justice for those harmed. Young activists also sought a say in political decisions. Amnesty's March 2026 assessment warned that exclusion and repression were continuing under military rule.^{[5][2]}

Institutional response

Rajoelina dissolved the government on 29 September 2025.^[6] He subsequently left power, and Colonel Michaël Randrianirina was sworn in on 17 October.^[2] The African Union suspended Madagascar after the military takeover.^[7] The president's departure met the resignation demand, but military succession did not give the youth campaign control of the transition or establish that its service and justice demands had been fulfilled.^[2]

What continued

The CIVICUS interviewee described work on a civic charter and the Konstitution'Nakà platform for public contributions to constitutional proposals.^[5] In April 2026, Gen Z 261 and Gen Z Madagascar officielle boycotted a meeting with the prime minister over members' detention. Herizo Andriamanantena was released under judicial supervision on 24 April. This was conditional release, not the end of his case or proof that all detainees were freed.^[4]

Across borders

The CIVICUS interviewee reported meetings with the European Union and UN Development Programme to seek support.^[5] These are specific reported contacts, alongside the circulation of international protest symbols. The African Union's suspension was a separate institutional response.^{[1][7]}

Sources

- [1] German Institute for International and Security Affairs — Gen Z, Digital Activism, and Regime Change in Madagascar
- [2] Amnesty International — From Gen Z revolt to junta control, Madagascar's promise of change is slipping away
- [3] Global Voices — Madagascar's Gen Z revolt over power and water cuts, 7 October 2025
- [4] Madagascar Tribune — Herizo under judicial supervision; distinct Gen Z branches, 25 April 2026
- [5] CIVICUS — MADAGASCAR: 'The government shouldn't forget that it's in power thanks to young people'
- [6] Reuters — Madagascar president dissolves government following deadly protests
- [7] The Guardian — African Union suspends Madagascar as military leader set to be sworn in as president